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Abstract     
This critique conducts a technical analysis of a UK Home Office report which was a key 
justification for passing the Immigration Act 2014. The law seeks to reduce non-EU 
immigration to the UK. The report is based on a 2012 report by the Migration Advisory 
Committee which used firmly established methods in the field of immigration studies. 
Despite this, it is concluded that the Home Office report not only excludes several 
important aspects of analysis, the entrepreneurialism of migrants and student 
immigration, but also has severe statistical problems. The report’s choice of 
operationalisations, lack of information regarding confidence intervals, and lack of 
sufficient model testing and repetition all combine to make it a weak piece of research 
and substantially undermine its suitability to inform policy. In the final analysis, this 
critique posits that the Home Office report reflects the Conservative government’s 
utilisation of 'policy driven evidence'. 
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Introduction 
Background and context  
The success of the campaign for a British exit from the European Union on the 23rd of 
June 2016 shocked the European establishment as well as many political commentators, 
academics, and the Remain voting segment of the British public. While Brexit was 
unprecedented, it reflects a rise in right wing parties and sentiment across Western 
democracies and was not entirely unforeseen (Dinas et al., 2016; Stockemer and 
Barisione, 2016). Donald Trump subsequently achieved an even more dramatic political 
coup in 2016 and Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen were in serious contention in the 
2017 Dutch and French elections respectively (Stockemer and Barisione, 2016).  The 
fulcrum around which the right pivots is immigration and there was a surge of anti-
immigrant feeling and racist attacks leading up to, and in the wake of, the Brexit vote. 
The most prominent of these incidents was the murder of the MP Jo Cox before the 2016 
referendum, which, while not directed against an immigrant, was perpetrated by an 
extreme right wing attacker who disagreed with Cox’s strong support of the EU and 
immigration. A more direct attack was the killing of Polish national Arkadiusz Jóźwik in 
Harlow also in 2016. Both of these murders were blamed, at least in part, on the rhetoric 
surrounding immigration which was laid bare during and after the referendum campaign 
(The Guardian, 2016). A House of Commons committee went as far as blaming 
government Ministers for contributing to the increased violence and bigotry by 
misrepresenting immigration numbers in 2014 (BBC News, 2014a). Clearly the 
sensitivity of immigration in the UK cannot be understated. 
  
 
Immigration is a divisive issue post-Brexit, but immigration policy has been a 
perennial issue in the UK. The country has experienced an increasing rate of net 
migration over the past fifty years; specific numbers vary depending on measurement but 
it is clear that the foreign born population of the UK has ascended over time which has, 
arguably, impacted on the economy and, some have argued, caused social tension in some 
areas of the UK where immigration is concentrated (Layton-Henry, 1985). In the past 
twenty years, in particular, there has been a sharp increase in net migration to the UK, and 
across the wider western world (Alfano et al., 2016). In the UK the foreign born 
population has grown from 8% in 2000 to around 13% in 2015 (Alfano et al., 2016). The 
possible negative economic effects of this increase have been brought into focus by the 
2008 financial crisis which has led some mainstream politicians, a variety of tabloids, and 
many members of the public to call for a change in UK immigration policy. 
 
The UK Conservative party, which has formed the government of the UK between 
2010 and time of writing (July 2017), is the most anti-immigration of the major UK 
parties. They champion ‘British values’ as well as economic factors in their rejection of 
mass immigration (BBC News, 2014a; Sheldon, 1990). In 2013 the Conservative led 
coalition government produced a policy entitled ‘Securing borders and reducing 
immigration’ which, with slight modification, became the ‘Immigration Bill’ and was 
passed into law as the ‘Immigration Act 2014’. The Bill was introduced by the current 
Prime Minister of the UK (as of July 2017) Theresa May as the then Home Secretary. The 
policy, bill, and subsequent Act of Parliament were justified based on the report and 
analysis: ‘Impacts of migration on UK native employment: An analytical review of the 
evidence’ (hereafter the ‘Home Office report’) (Devlin et al., 2014). This was produced 
  
jointly by the Home Office and Department of Business and Innovation in 2013 but not 
published until 2014. Its methodology was an extension of a study carried out by the 
Migration Advisory Committee (hereafter ‘MAC’) in 2012 entitled ‘Analysis of the 
Impacts of Migration’ (Metcalf, 2012). The Home Office report concludes that, in times 
of economic depression, non-EU migrants displace native workers in the economy 
(Devlin et al., 2014). The report does not make recommendations for the provisions found 
in the Act itself but instead it was used to highlight the alleged negatives of immigration 
and justify the need for the Act and it passing into law.  
 
The Act 
The legislation itself is broken down into 4 main components; removal, appeals, access to 
services, and miscellaneous. The provisions in the removal section aim to make it easier 
for people without leave to remain to be deported and include not having to give notice of 
deportation and allowing family members to be removed without individual rulings. The 
Act does not define what constitutes ‘family members’ and this omission was criticised 
by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, but no changes were made 
(Grant, 2014). The Act overhauls the appeals process in an attempt to make it harder to 
bring appeals. Generally immigrants are not permitted to appeal against decisions about 
their immigration status unless they seek asylum or a claim a breach of human rights. If 
the person can be removed to a safe country, appeals that are permitted generally happen 
after deportation. The access to services part of the Act was the most controversial, 
affecting housing and the NHS. Those without leave to remain are banned from entering 
into tenancy agreements and landlords are legally responsible for checking the 
immigration status of those they are renting to. The homeless charity Shelter Scotland 
argued that these changes would increase racial discrimination from landlords and put 
  
vulnerable people at risk of homelessness (Shelter Scotland, 2016). The provisions in the 
Act related to the NHS make it harder for immigrants to access health services by 
introducing an ‘Immigration Health Surcharge’ to be paid during the visa or immigration 
application process. The test of who constitutes an ‘ordinary resident’ (who do not pay for 
the NHS) was also altered to encapsulate anyone without indefinite leave to remain – this 
includes international students and those with temporary leave who may work, and pay 
tax, in the UK but will still have to pay the charge to access services on the NHS (UK 
Government, 2014). The final main part of the act covers various areas and attempts to 
make it more difficult for those without leave to remain to live in the UK. This includes; 
banks having the responsibility to check immigration status and refusing accounts to non-
residents, those without leave to remain being banned from being issued a driving licence, 
and closer Home Office scrutiny of marriage which can be used to infer nationality (UK 
Government, 2014). The intention of these provisions is clearly to make the UK a less 
appealing destination for immigration and to make it easier for the government to remove 
people from the UK. More than that however, many provisions of the Act are clearly an 
attempt to make it impossible for those without leave to remain to live in the UK by 
limiting access to services and housing.  
 
The provisions found in the Act are insidious and they have the potential to be 
even more damaging to people’s lives if, in the future, they are combined with legislation 
which changes who is allowed to come to or stay in the UK. The Immigration Act 2014 
effectively lays the groundwork for a sharp shift to the right in immigration policy 
making. At the time of writing (July 2017) the UK is recovering from a General Election 
in which the Conservatives lost their majority but managed to assemble a minority 
government with Theresa May, who introduced the original Bill, remaining Prime 
  
Minister. Although the Conservative’s power in parliament has been weakened, and Mrs 
May’s premiership may yet prove untenable, they remain the largest party in parliament 
and, with support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland, 
maintain a working majority. Although the Immigration Act 2014 does not currently 
affect EU migrants, the British exit from the EU threatens to create a perfect storm for 
immigration policy making where a Conservative government, supported by the DUP, 
will have the power to legislate on both EU and non-EU migration. In these 
circumstances it would not be surprising to see the provisions of the Immigration Act 
2014 being extended to cover all migrants, particularly in the rush to fill the legislative 
lacuna in the wake of Brexit with no time to write and pass new legislation. This is 
speculative, but with EU citizens likely to lose the protections currently afforded to them, 
it is plausible, David Cameron even alluded to such a direction when he was Prime 
Minister (Conservative Party, 2014). Therefore, while the Act is not directly affected by 
Brexit, its relevance has only grown in the years since it passed and, particularly with the 
increase in violence and racism, a critical analysis of the evidence upon which it is built is 
more pertinent now than ever. 
 
The coalition government (2010-2015), Conservative majority government (2015-
2017), and Conservative minority government (2017 onwards), withheld a second report, 
penned by the Civil Service in 2014, which could potentially undermine the Immigration 
Act by revising down the negative impact of immigrants on the economy and casting 
doubt over the findings of the first analysis (BBC News, 2014b). This revised study was 
deemed politically unpalatable at a time when the government was missing immigration 
targets (BBC News, 2015) and has still not been published at time of writing, possibly 
due to the atmosphere post-Brexit and the continued pressure of immigration targets 
  
(BBC New, 2016). Even without this withheld report, however, the Home Office report, 
and MAC analysis it is based on, are not beyond reproach and exhibit several issues 
which undermine their conclusions and suitability to inform legislation (Devlin et al., 
2014; Metcalf, 2012). A thorough critique of the Home Office report is therefore 
pertinent at a time when immigration is coming to dominate a post-Brexit British political 
dialogue. 
 
Critique 
This evaluation will examine the validity of the Immigration Act by examining the Home 
Office report used to justify it. It will take a three-part approach: firstly assessing the 
responses to the report from other sources, then reviewing other similar quantitative 
studies of immigration. Finally, the mainstay of the critique will involve a technical 
review of the data and methodology used by the report itself. This final section will be 
sub-divided into operationalisations, model results, and model testing. Ideally the models 
presented in the Home Office report and the MAC analysis would be reconstructed which 
would allow detailed diagnosis of any issues present. However, sufficient information on 
specification is not available in either of the reports or any other supplementary materials. 
The Home Office was contacted in an attempt to solicit these specifications for this 
critique, but they were not forthcoming. 
 
Throughout the analysis, this critique will seek to understand whether the report 
constitutes evidence driven policy; or 'policy driven evidence' (Consterdine, 2013). 
Consterdine (2013) suggests that 'policy driven evidence' reflects an unscrupulous 
approach to policy making where the conclusions are preconceived on the basis of 
partisan political beliefs and then the evidence is sourced or fabricated via unethical or 
  
selective research methods (Consterdine, 2013). Consterdine (2013) argued that the 
Conservative led coalition government, which existed from 2010 to 2015, and produced 
the Home Office report, was guilty of 'policy driven evidence'. The critique will conclude 
with an estimation of the validity of this assertion.  
 
Contemporaneous Responses 
'Impacts of migration on UK native employment: An analytical review of the evidence' 
was published in March 2014 and drew immediate criticism (Devlin et al., 2014). The 
Centre for Entrepreneurs and the company DueDil released a joint report detailing the 
positive contribution immigrants have made to the UK economy. Their publication, 
'Migrant Entrepreneurs: Building Our Businesses Creating Our Jobs', does not reference 
the immigration report directly, as it was written concurrently. However a press release 
issued by The Centre for Entrepreneurs outlined their opposition to the Home Office 
report based on the evidence from their study (Smith and Rock, 2014). The study 
investigated the entrepreneurial contributions of various strata of UK society and found 
immigrants to be nearly twice as likely to start businesses as native UK citizens. The 
report claims that immigrant businesses are responsible for 14% of all jobs in the UK 
economy and while migrants are not usually as skilled or educated as native workers, they 
are more ambitious and achieve business success despite barriers such as lack of skills 
and accessing finance (Johnson and Kimmelman, 2014). The study also commissioned an 
opinion poll which found that despite their contributions, the majority of people do not 
have a positive view of immigrants in the economy (Johnson and Kimmelman, 2014). It 
concludes that public opinion does not reflect the reality of immigration and its impact on 
the economy (Johnson and Kimmelman, 2014). The Centre for Entrepreneurs report 
clearly demonstrates that the Home Office report is lacking a major dimension of 
  
analysis. Its design presumes that all immigrants are workers seeking an already existing 
job. It classifies migrants by age and education but does not allow for the entrepreneurial 
dimension of immigration to be measured. The Centre for Entrepreneurs report claims 
that almost 20% of migrants start businesses, which points to a major omission in the 
Home Office report (Smith and Rock, 2014). 
 
A second press release issued in the wake of the report outlined the position of 
Universities UK, an organisation representing virtually all higher education institutions in 
the UK. Universities UK suggest that the restrictions introduced by the Immigration Act 
could harm foreign studentship in the UK and damage its position as one of the world’s 
fastest growing destinations for higher study (Universities UK, 2014). The press release 
draws on a report published by The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills which 
estimates that overseas students currently contribute over £10 billion to the UK economy 
each year (HM Government, 2013). It concludes that the Immigration Act has the 
potential to damage not only the UK economy but also institutions which are dependent 
on foreign student’s tuition fees. The government affirmed its support for growing the UK 
as a destination for foreign students 2013 (HM Government Press Office, 2013) but 
neither the Home Office report underpinning the Immigration Act, nor the Act itself, 
make adjustment for, or reference to, the 300,000 non-EU foreign nationals studying at 
UK institutions (Devlin et al., 2014; UKCISA Statistics, 2014). Indeed, the design of the 
Home Office report and MAC analysis do not account for education and classify people 
in education as ‘employed’ (Devlin et al., 2014; Metcalf, 2012). While there is 
competition for spaces at UK universities it is clearly distinct from competition in the 
labour market and classing 300,000 students erroneously as competing in the labour 
market could have a major effect on the accuracy of the report’s findings. It could even 
  
lead to systematic bias and over estimation of results, particularly as many foreign 
students do not stay in the UK after they complete their education and so do not go on to 
compete in the job market. This suggests another flaw in the Home Office report and it is 
an issue which was highlighted in the media by the deportation of A-level student 
Yashika Bageerathi in the same year the report was published (BBC News, 2014c) and 
more recently by a scandal involving the wrongful deportation of 48,000 overseas 
students by the then UK Home Secretary, Theresa May (currently Prime Minister as of 
May 2017)(The Independent, 2016).  
 
Previous Studies 
Having discussed direct responses to the Home Office report, this section will examine 
other studies which have attempted to determine the impact of immigration on the UK job 
market and economy more widely. The studies will not be discussed in detail as they 
generally fail to find reliable results and this section aims to highlight the challenges 
faced by research of this type. The Home Office report shares many methodological 
similarities with this body of evidence and this was the area of knowledge to which it was 
trying to contribute (Devlin et al., 2014). Examining this body of work will reveal the 
perennial issues which are faced by researchers in this area. 
 
Immigration, and particularly its impact on the economy, is a branch of research 
plagued by methodological and data quality issues. It generally relies on secondary 
analysis of large scale social surveys, of which there are many, but each comes with its 
own drawbacks. Generally those detailed enough to provide relevant insights are too 
small to be statistically significant and those large enough to be statistically significant 
suffer from a lack of detail. Previous research projects have used a variety of 
  
methodologies to try and overcome these issues in the data, with varying degrees of 
success.  
 
Generally these studies use the Labour Force Survey, General Household Survey 
or the Worker Registration Scheme, although some use more niche sources of data. The 
majority of studies in this area (including the Home Office report) focus on spatial 
analysis in which data is divided down by geographical regions and compared to account 
for the very different labour markets across the UK (Devlin et al., 2014). This is opposed 
to the skill-cell approach which breaks the data down by educational level or some other 
measure of skill stratification which accounts for different levels of the economy. This 
alternative method is used by a small minority of studies. Using these methods, several 
studies have returned results with moderate effects of immigrants on native employment 
but which are insignificant (Dustman et al., 2003; Dustmann et al., 2005; Lemos and 
Portes, 2008; Lucchino et al., 2012). Alternatively some studies have been statistically 
significant but have found tiny effects hardly worthy of note (Metcalf, 2012; Nickell and 
Saleheen, 2008; Reed and Latorre, 2009). The problems faced by these studies are very 
similar to those which the Home Office report sought to overcome and are detailed below 
in the specific discussion of the report (Devlin et al., 2014). To date, vanishingly few 
immigration studies of the UK have found both noteworthy and significant results for the 
general impact of immigration on employment and an expected body of post-Brexit 
research has yet to make it to print. The existing evidence is inconclusive and cannot, in 
good faith, be used to support either side of the immigration debate. Immigrants may have 
an effect on native employment, positive or negative, but there isn’t reliable evidence of 
either, despite a raft of studies.  
 
  
While these studies are not as timely as the Home Office report, their continued 
difficulties stem from a perennial problem in the underlying data which the Home Office 
report is also subject to (Devlin et al., 2014). These issues set the stage for a review of the 
report itself which suffers from a range of serious flaws. 
 
Operationalisation 
The main finding of the report, which was used to justify the Immigration Act 2014, is a 
negative link between non-EU immigrants and native employment, indicating migrants 
replacing UK citizens in the job market (Devlin et al., 2014). The technical aspects of this 
finding will be assessed below but first is it prudent to examine issues of 
operationalisation which determines how data is coded, which variables are used, and 
how models are designed. These issues underpin any statistical results and relate to 
problems experienced by other scholars in the field as detailed previously. The Home 
Office report acknowledges the difficulties faced by other studies in its literature review, 
but suggests that it can succeed where other investigations have failed by using the most 
up to date (at the time) waves of Labour Force Survey data (Devlin et al., 2014). It asserts 
that since the effects of the economic downturn have only been apparent since 2008, a 
relatively small increase to the overall number of cases in the data could make the 
difference between statistical significance and insignificance because of when the data 
was collected (Devlin et al., 2014). The authors hope that having a good volume of data 
from after the financial crisis, when the economy was depressed, will make the effects of 
migration on native employment more marked and easier to test statically; they posit this 
as the reason that the MAC analysis and their report are valid against a backdrop of 
statistically insignificant previous studies. Before discussing whether or not this is the 
case, a review of the design of the study is relevant. 
  
 
The report uses a similar design to previous studies, particularly the MAC analysis 
which it is an extension of. It draws upon the Labour Force Survey, breaks the data down 
into regions (the spatial approach) and uses the respondent’s country of birth to determine 
immigration status. It then carries out a multiple regression with native employment as 
the dependent variable and a variety of immigration, age and qualification categories as 
independent variables.  
 
The use of country of birth as a proxy for immigration status is not ideal and leads 
to inaccuracies as it cannot distinguish between migrants who have citizenship, those who 
do not, and UK natives born abroad. This choice of operationalisation is driven by a lack 
of good data for ‘nationality’ which suffers from ambiguity in most data sources. The 
Home Office report acknowledges this shortcoming and attempts to justify its design by 
providing an alternative model where nationality is used in place of country of birth 
which reduces the statistical significance of the model considerably (Devlin et al., 2014). 
It also points out that the use of country of birth is a common concession in the extant 
body of research. While this is true, justifying a poor operationalisation does nothing to 
reduce its impact on the results. 
 
A second issue with the operationalisations used by the report is the use of ‘native 
employment’. As previously stated this measure spuriously includes higher education 
students and, additionally, using such a simplistic abstraction of the UK labour market 
could lead to an inaccurate estimation of the effects of immigration. A report into poverty 
by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in 2014 brought this issue into sharp focus when it 
concluded that there are more impoverished underemployed people in the labour market 
  
than there are impoverished unemployed people outside of it (MacInnes et al., 2014). This 
has been driven by an increase in part-time work, zero-hours contracts, and wage 
compression, and blamed, at least in part, on the focus on simple employment rate 
(MacInnes et al., 2014). The implications of this mis-operationalisation for the findings of 
the Home Office report are not discernible, but it at least suggests that whatever the 
ultimate findings of the report they will not fully or accurately capture the poverty which 
employment is being used as a proxy measure for (Devlin et al., 2014). In other words the 
report makes the assumption that a lower native employment rate alone is implicitly bad 
but it provides no evidence or further work to substantiate this. 
 
A third issue with operationalisation was highlighted by Dustmann, a veteran 
analyst in this area. In 2014 he and Frattini chose to look at tax and welfare contributions 
by migrants rather than wage and employment impacts (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). 
They achieved highly significant results with moderate magnitudes, and performed 
enough robustness checks to conclude that, since 2000, immigrants have made a net 
contribution to the UKs budget. While this is not directly related to the scope of the Home 
Office report, it does suggest a further factor which was not considered or accounted for 
in the Home Office report which simply looks at employment (Devlin et al., 2014). 
 
Finally, another paper by Dutmann and several colleagues published in 2016 
advocates that employment and wage impacts should be modelled together to obtain 
accurate results because wages impact on employment and vice versa (Dustmann et al., 
2016). The Home Office report eschews estimating wages, citing complexity (Devlin et 
al., 2014). 
 
  
In general the report’s operationalisations are not robust and expose the findings 
to several sources of inaccuracy and mismeasurement. However, they are consistent with 
previous studies and generally reflect, with a few specific exceptions, issues with the 
available sources of data. The impacts these choices of operationalisation have on the 
ultimate findings of the report are hard to disentangle from each other, but the conclusion 
of the report should at least acknowledge this weakness more explicitly. 
 
Model results 
Confidence intervals 
The report's main finding is a moderate negative association between non-EU migrants 
and native employment meaning the model estimates that non-EU migrants have a 
negative effect on native employment (Devlin et al., 2014: 54). The coefficient for this 
estimate is -0.230 (Devlin et al., 2014). This gives the strength and direction of the 
association; the minus indicates a negative effect and 0.23 is a moderate magnitude (the 
scale extends from 0, meaning no effect, to 1 meaning completely correlated). Neither EU 
migrants nor any breakdown of migrants by age or education returns a coefficient above 
0.1 which suggests very small effects (Devlin et al., 2014). The entire conclusion and 
recommendation of the report is based on the single moderate finding for non-EU 
migrants, but without more information it is unwise to conclude that this result is 
consequential. The most important piece of omitted information is the confidence interval 
for the main coefficient. Confidence intervals are the range which the model estimates 
contains the true value of the coefficient – usually calculated to 95% confidence – this 
reflects uncertainly (Berry, 1993). Confidence intervals can range from tight to wide 
depending on numerous factors – chiefly the sample size and how spread out the data is. 
The coefficient reported is in the middle of the intervals but the true value can lie 
  
anywhere in the confidence range and there is a small chance that it lies outwith this 
range.  The report also omits the standard error which can be used to easily calculate the 
confidence interval and which is often included in place of the intervals to save space; 
however, the original MAC analysis includes an identical model and does report the 
standard errors for this coefficient as 0.058. Applying this to a coefficient of -0.230, 
results in a 95% confidence interval of -0.11632 to -0.34368 – this is the plausible range 
of the effect size. Consequently there is a greater range of values possible for this 
coefficient than the report implies; the lower end (-0.12) would be a small effect of little 
note. Furthermore there are several issues with confidence testing which are not 
acknowledged by the report and could undermine the reported coefficient further. Firstly, 
confidence intervals, and consequently the coefficient calculated from their median, are 
not a statement of how likely it is that the true value lies within the reported range but 
rather how often the range falls upon the true value in the long run (Magnusson, 2014). 
Put simply they are a statement of the accuracy of the model algorithm over time and not 
an individual result (Morey et al., 2016). Secondly, the average of a sample has no 
relation to its spread and consequently the tightness of a confidence interval is not related 
to how likely it is to include the true value and is not a measure of accuracy in that regard 
(Morey et al., 2016). These issues are both highly technical but to summarise, there is no 
way to test beyond doubt that a single model or result is accurate and meaningful. The 
way around this issue is replication of results using different samples, algorithms, data, or 
methods (Morey et al., 2016). The report acknowledges this itself and argues that a 
‘triangulation’ approach is best practice but there is no explanation as to why this was not 
attempted. The model presented still has some value alone but it is not nearly robust 
enough to support the final conclusion the report comes to, which is that non-EU migrants 
displace native people in the economy. 
  
 
A more minor issue concerns why confidence information was not presented in 
the Home Office report itself (Devlin et al., 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated in 
all major statistical software packages when a regression is carried out and the original 
MAC report included standard errors. Including at least one of these statistics is standard 
practice. Why this was not done could simply be for presentation reasons but the same 
results table peculiarly includes both numerical P-values (discussed below) and redundant 
asterisks for indicating the P-value, suggesting space for presentation was not an issue. 
Additionally the P-values are presented below each coefficient in parenthesis which is a 
common way to display standard errors, while P-values are usually displayed in a 
separate column on the same row. While ascribing this as an attempt to deceive may be 
unsubstantiated, the layout is unorthodox and may constitute an attempt to obfuscate 
critical information about the model in order to shroud its deficiencies.   
 
Significance 
Statistical significance (previously referred to as P-values) is a measure of the chances 
that an observed pattern may be randomly occurring (Berry, 1993). It is directly related to 
confidence intervals discussed above; significance increases the further the confidence 
intervals are from including zero (zero meaning there is no effect so being further from it 
means the fining is more likely to be valid). In practice, significance indicates how valid a 
result is – if it is insignificant there is a good chance it occurred simply by chance. The 
conventional significance threshold is below 0.05. This means that there is a 5% chance 
of the result just being due to chance; 5 heads in a row on a coin flip would be below a 
0.05 significance level, and therefore significant, and we might conclude that there is 
something going on (such as the coin being weighted). This is the same logic followed 
  
when reading regression output; for a result to be valid its P-value has to be below the 
0.05 threshold and, therefore, significant.  
 
In the main model from the Home Office report the key result, the negative effect 
immigrants have on native employment, is significant to a reasonable degree with a P-
value of 0.003 (0.3% chance of randomness or about 8 heads flipped in a row on a fair 
coin) (Devlin et al., 2014). There are several other variables which are significant but they 
are largely treated as controls and do not feed into the conclusions (they are there to 
improve the robustness of the main result). The Home Office report provides an updated 
model based on the main model from the MAC analysis in which the main independent 
variable is even more significant, though the observed coefficient is slightly smaller 
(Devlin et al., 2014). This model is not useful however given that no standard error is 
presented and its credibility is therefore difficult to assess. 
 
Therefore the main finding of the study, that non-EU migrants negatively impact 
native employment, is the only relevant finding and, while it is significant, there are other 
issues which undermine it. The study provides a version of the main regression model 
excluding London from the analysis (Devlin et al., 2014: 54). Though not explicitly 
discussed, this is an attempt to test the robustness of the results when the specification of 
the model is altered arbitrarily. This change renders the main finding statistically 
insignificant (at a 5% threshold) which emphasises the fragility of the model. There is 
also no information in the Home Office report about pre-estimation data preparation or 
post-estimation testing (Devlin et al., 2014). The MAC report, alternatively, details 
testing undertaken for the removal of outliers and log transformations (Metcalf, 2012). 
The result of removing outliers and the log transformation (which is an arbitrary change 
  
similar to removing London) is the model becoming insignificant which further suggests 
that it is fragile to changes in specification. The report acknowledges these shortcomings 
but continues to present a strong conclusion based on one result from one category of one 
model which looks increasingly fragile. Given that all results in statistical analysis have 
an associated degree of uncertainly, even the strongest and most clear-cut results, it is 
important not only to prove that results are resistant to specification change, but also to 
carry out analyses repeatedly to provide evidence that a single result was not simply due 
to random chance. This is good practice in statistical research, especially when variables 
are of dubious quality, and is recommended most forcefully by Lambert (Lambert and 
Bihagen, 2014; Lambert, 2015)  among others in various fields and contexts (Andersen, 
2008; Berk, 2004; Gelman and Hill, 2006; Treiman, 2009). The report not paying heed to 
these long standing standards of quantitative research suggests that the authors may have 
been ‘significance chasing’, a practice where model specifications are varied until 
significant results are obtained and then the specification is defended post-hoc  (Ware and 
Munafò, 2015). This is bad practice and would suggest ‘policy driven evidence’ if 
confirmed.  
 
Being fragile and in an already weak position from which to inform policy, the 
design of the study has two other major flaws concerning model testing which both have 
the potential to undermine the entire research design – endogeneity and 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
Model testing 
Endogeneity 
  
Endogeneity refers to a situation where a variable or effect which is not in the model has 
an effect on both the dependent (the key variable being looked at, in this case native 
employment) and one or more of the independent variables (the variables which predict 
the dependent) (Berry, 1993).  This often arises where several variables react to each 
other, for example an increase in price will affect both supply and demand which also 
affect each other. If one of these variables was missing it would have a negative effect on 
the accuracy of the model.  
 
Endogeneity is a potentially problematic issue for quantitative analysis which 
should be examined with model testing. The MAC analysis does test for endogeneity 
bias, among other tests, in its appendix. The testing carried out by the MAC report 
suggested potential endogeneity bias (Metcalf, 2012: 167). Endogeneity, in this context, 
relates to the propensity of migrants to move to areas of the country with more available 
jobs; they do not spread evenly or at random. This is an un-modelled effect which has the 
potential to undermine the main finding of the model; in effect the model is missing a 
variable (the attractiveness of different areas to migrants). This omission has the potential 
to bias the standard errors, and thus, the significance figure reported which the Home 
Office report places a lot of weight on (Devlin et al., 2014).  The MAC analysis reports 
this issue; the Home Office report, mentions that it was problematic for the MAC analysis 
but does not re-test for it, adjust for it, or refer to it again in its own conclusion (Devlin et 
al., 2014; Metcalf, 2012). 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity refers to a situation where the error term of a model is not normally 
distributed, which is a key assumption of regression modelling (Andersen, 2008; Berry, 
  
1993; Kaufman, 2013). This occurs most commonly when the accuracy of a variable 
changes across its range. This is very common with predictions of the future; predicting 
the rate of inflation in the UK next week will be quite accurate while predicting it in a 
year will be less so. Another example is predicting the weight of people based on their 
height; children exhibit relatively little variation but as they age the data spreads out. If 
this spread is uncontrolled for in a regression it will bias the standard errors, which affects 
the significance (Berry, 1993; Kaufman, 2013). Heteroscedasticity is a complex issue and 
more information can be found in Kaufman (2013). 
 
All linear regressions should test for heteroscedasticity and adjust where 
appropriate but the Home Office report does not make any reference to testing or 
adjustment made for this potential issue (Devlin et al., 2014). It would not be unusual for 
the data to be heteroscedastic; the majority of real life data sources have heteroscedastic 
qualities but good research needs to test, acknowledge and adjust where appropriate 
(Andersen, 2008). Techniques to help quell the effects of heteroscedasticity include 
robust regressions and robust standard errors. The Home Office report not only fails to 
make either of these adjustments but ignores the issue completely (Devlin et al., 2014). 
 
The effects of heteroscedasticity on a model’s outcomes are usually small but 
quelling them generally involves removing outliers or widening confidence intervals 
(Andersen, 2008). As already discussed above, either of these issues is likely render the 
Home Office model insignificant and in combination with the other issues discussed 
above heteroscedasticity could be a major problem. If the researchers wished to find a 
particular result then heteroscedasticity is problematic. Heteroscedasticity testing and 
adjustment are complex statistical techniques and it is common for researchers, even in 
  
academia, to ignore the issue. Kaufman, a social statistician, found that three quarters of 
the regressions used in the American Sociological Review make no reference to, and are 
potentially undermined by, heteroscedasticity (2013). It could therefore be suggested that 
the lack of heteroscedasticity testing in the Home Office report is an attempt to obfuscate 
the model’s deficiencies or retain the single significant result, but it might be fairer to 
ascribe its omission to ignorance.  
  
Nevertheless the Home Office report is undermined not only by its design and 
limitations in the data, leading to low coefficients and statistical insignificance, but also 
by its issues with confidence intervals, endogeneity, and heteroscedasticity which further 
undermines its already weak findings (Devlin et al., 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
A novice quantitative researcher could pick up the Home Office report and find it 
reasonably convincing; its primary model returns a significant and noteworthy result for 
the key independent variable (Devlin et al., 2014). However, when a more critical eye it 
brought to bear, it is clear that the report is on shaky methodological ground. The models 
in the report use poorly operationalised dependent and independent variables; they do not 
have adequate information to properly interpret them; and they are likely undermined by 
a combination of underlying issues which have largely not been tested for and have 
certainly not been adjusted for. Most of the flaws are small on their own, but combined 
they add up to severe issues which seriously undermine the findings of the report. These 
problems are not unique to the Home Office analysts; they are common to all quantitative 
researchers, who deal with them with a wide variety of competence. What is unique to 
this report is the peculiar way in which results are presented, as if to conceal flaws, and 
  
the disconnect between the statistical results and the final assentation that non-EU 
migration displaces native workers (Devlin et al., 2014). 
 
The previous reports into immigration, detailed earlier in this critique, all suffered 
from almost identical issues but none of them claimed to have found concrete influential 
results. The Home Office report not only claims that it has reached a robust conclusion, 
but went on to become the justification for a law which could affect millions of people in 
subsequent years and decades (Devlin et al., 2014). To put this in another context, one 
significant result, from one particular specification of a model was used to justify a 
controversial Act of Parliament.  
 
Although it is not verifiable, there is a high possibility of political bias in the 
Home Office report. Consterdine (2013) referred to the British institutions of immigration 
policy making as using 'policy driven evidence'. The report comes in the wake of over 20 
years of evidence based immigration research which has generally failed to find 
significant or meaningful results (in the UK at least) and the authors of this research claim 
to have found results robust enough to defend an Act of Parliament. Whether this research 
was deliberately conducted in an unethical fashion or simply carried out badly isn’t a 
question that can be definitively answered, but the way it was conducted suggests 
‘significance hunting’ and the disconnection between the findings and the strength of the 
final conclusion suggest external bias. Evidence supporting this conclusion can be found 
in the Home Office report itself when the authors conclude in the light of poor results 
that:  
“…in advising on government policy, government analysts have to make a 
judgement.” (Devlin et al., 2014: 52) 
  
The conclusion of this critique, therefore, is unsurprising: ‘Impacts of migration on UK 
native employment: An analytical review of the evidence’ is a deeply flawed report which 
should not have been used to inform government policy (Devlin et al., 2014). 
 
There is no robust evidence backing the Immigration Act 2014.  Whether one 
thinks a change in immigration policy is prudent remains, largely, a question of value 
based bias; the empirical evidence is simply not robust enough to support a conclusion on 
either side of the debate, as demonstrated by the failure of multiple previous studies. It is 
in this vacuum of evidence that hateful and racist rhetoric flourish and it would appear 
that the Conservative led coalition may have commissioned this report to distance 
themselves from that rhetoric and to lend a veneer of credibility to a policy they wished to 
pass on partisan grounds. Given that some sections of the media cast anti-immigration 
politics as racist and bigoted this desire for credibility is unsurprising (Consterdine, 
2013), but if the government wished to provide an evidence based endorsement for its 
policy, it needed to look no further than descriptive survey statistics. The survey carried 
out by DueDil for example found that twice as many people support a reduction in 
immigration than support an increase (Johnson and Kimmelman, 2014: 6).  
 
The previous leader of the Conservative party, David Cameron, made a speech in 
the wake of his government missing its immigration targets in 2014 in which he detailed 
plans to curb benefits for EU migrants which parallels and extends the provisions of the 
Immigration Act 2014 (which only applies to non-EU migrants) (Conservative Party, 
2014). This is clearly suggestive of continued partisan policy making on matters of 
immigration and indicates that, with the UK separation from the EU imminent, poorly 
justified legislation may soon come to affect all immigrants to the UK and millions of 
  
people’s lives. The evidence to support these policies is nearly non-existent and there is a 
strong suggestion that they are partisan, tactical, and political. 
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